completed by our prior
observation that just bringing the chaplain in with prayer allows transitioning
from the policy infrastructure to the trust infrastructure, where the reliance
on others is enhanced and brings the group to a better survival position.
Finally, we wouldn’t want to stop our investigation before introducing again
the idea that prayer must be providing positive chemical releases in the brain
on the road to ecstasy, which is both a reward in itself and a necessary
ingredient in the trust ritual that we just discussed.
Now, we’re not
really seeking to delve into the specific effectiveness of prayer within any
religion. That would take us full tilt into the tumult of trying to determine
how best to evaluate a process, through anecdote or through statistics. From a
societal perspective, we’re all familiar with the anecdotal recounting of the
power of prayer; and, the fact that prayer seems to have been with us, as a
species, for as long as religion, would seem to lend some credence to a
statistically significant belief in, if not objective observation of, the power
of prayer. Certainly, we should note that prayer really does seem to be a
common denominator among religions. But, our purpose is to consider the concept
of prayer as a springboard to establishing the conceptualization of a social
ecosystem from which can be derived the more detailed aspects of a generic
ontology, or, in simpler words, a formal model of society. We would expect to
be able to place trust and policy infrastructures in this ontology, which we
will proceed to do further down in this chapter.
It is
illuminating to note that prayer offers an excellent model of the appellate
process of the United States judicial system. The Congress and the
President ostensibly form the ultimate policy purveyors of this social
ecosystem. The Supreme Court, as the highest court involved in policy
adjudication, comprises the ultimate policy arbiter of the social ecosystem.
However, through its preeminent right to interpret the Constitution, the
Supreme Court also comprises the ultimate trust arbiter of the system. The
illustration gets even more compelling. In certain instances, the Supreme Court
can also effect profound changes in the policy infrastructure; in essence, it
becomes in such cases the ultimate policy purveyor as well. The closing
admonition of Supreme Court decisions is obviously telling in this regards: “It
is so ordered.” The fact that there is no redress, short of an Amendment to the
Constitution, for such a pronouncement from the Supreme Court also suggests
that it can function as the ultimate purveyor of trust within this social
ecosystem. Such would be the act of God within a monotheistic religion. To
illustrate this point, it is interesting to consider one of the predominant
issues of our times regarding governance within the United States’ primary
policy infrastructure, the Supreme Court opinion in the case of Roe versus
Wade.
This opinion was
the end result of an appellate process concerning a case of a woman’s access to
abortion services. We would suggest that the initial class action suit from
which was promulgated the ultimate ruling could be properly construed as
petitionary prayer. While precipitated within the policy infrastructure, its
clear goal was the ultimate trust arbiters of the entire social ecosystem; that
is, an interpretation by the Supreme Court of the United States’ Constitution. An opinion was issued by
the Supreme Court on January 22, 1973. While volumes have been written
regarding this case and the resulting decision, from our perspective two points
emerged that are central to a model of social ecosystems. First, the opinion
confirmed the primacy of the United States Constitution and its interpretation
by the Supreme Court as the ultimate trust authority inasmuch as the result was
to overturn a decision based on law under the State of Texas Constitution. Second, through the mechanism of this
opinion, a new basic tenet was recognized as being contained within the
Constitution, a Right to Privacy that
had not been previously recognized in an explicit fashion. The majority on the
court would likely suggest that the right was always there; it simply required
the actions of someone able to read it. The fact that the decision was a seven
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