Thus, in being able to define what constitutes a church the position of the state effectively becomes supreme. Since the state can create a church it can take steps to preserve it, but it can also take steps to destroy it; at least as a recognized subordinate trust infrastructure. It then becomes of interest to understand how the state is different from the church? It would seem that the defining control of government over religion constitutes a social organization that is, at best, only mildly distinct from the religions over which it exerts control. Indeed, for many religious devotees the characteristics of this control constitute a new religion in its own right; secular humanism is a term sometimes used for this perceived quasi-religious social structure. Certainly government within the United States has many of the trappings of religious organizations, with defining documents that establish a core set of beliefs or dogma along with the rationale for their application and the consequences of their action; in other words, a theology. It effects a governing organizational structure, and a means of enforcing adherence to dogma. Moreover, it establishes the equivalent of a clergy to act as arbiters of policy and to help adherents to understand the paths to righteousness.

While we proudly proclaim that we are a nation of laws, we also consider the Constitution, our primary source of dogma, a living document subject to evolving interpretation according to the prevalent social environment of the time. As we noted in the Prologue, this is an artifact of language based on metaphorical understanding adapted to context. As we also observed in the Prologue, the resulting interpretation and re-interpretation can result in huge swings in applicable policy. Our understanding of the physical world suggests a characteristic of immutability for laws that minimizes subjectivity. However, social systems are predicated upon the subjective interpretation and application of policy. Thus, while our societal laws are there to ostensibly guide the actions of everyone, should a problem of interpretation arise we must resort to some form of consequence resolution. Our mechanism for such resolution, the judicial system, is so complex and arcane as to require representation from a “clergy” for guidance in navigating its treacherous shoals. Moreover, we are admonished that “one who represents himself in legal proceedings has a fool for a client.”

The assumption is that the actions of attorneys, through the protocols of the judicial system, are in fact required to render the final interpretation of applicable policy. Even in these situations, it seems that most litigating attorneys will assert that they can never predict what a given jury will decide. The end result is that one might well anticipate more assurance in handicapping a horse race than in predicting how a particular social law will be interpreted and applied. While the interpretation and application of socially derived policy might not be quite as arbitrary as our words have implied, in fact virtually no company would think of issuing a public proclamation without running it by the lawyers first. The fact that we must all rise when the judge enters the courtroom seems as clear an act of contrition and supplication as genuflecting upon entering the sanctuary or making a cross of ashes on our foreheads on a certain Wednesday of each year. However, there are perhaps no more revealing illustrations of the parallels between religious and

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