asserting a specific name
is always the same biophysical person?” If we reflect on the discussion about
identity in Chapter 9, what we’re really considering is the mechanism through
which to establish an anchored persona.
Given the
differential identity registry established through the census, a necessary
addition to provide for experiential identity is a policy infrastructure
allowing for the creation and operation of trusted third parties. Today’s best
technological approach to this infrastructure is the establishment of a public
key infrastructure such as we discussed in some detail in Chapter 8 and in
Chapter 9. This entails the creation of a means to build a hierarchy of trusted
third parties that emanates from a root organization that forms the base of the
hierarchy. In practice, it is plausible to consider a collection of independent
hierarchies, each with its own root organization. To simplify our current
discussion, however, let’s consider a single hierarchy that is grounded in some
federal agency that parallels the Bureau of the Census. We suggest a federal
agency because, given the critical nature of the public key infrastructure and
its constituent transcendent personal devices, the consequences of abrogation
of the policy under which the infrastructure and devices are provided should be
correspondingly profound. Such consequences may constitute an overwhelming
level of risk for any organization that doesn’t benefit from the concept of
sovereign immunity. So, for the moment, let’s assume that the device is derived
from a government agency, perhaps akin to a driver license. For example, we
might consider establishing it in a context similar to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. They are charged with storage, protection and study of
the most virulent disease manifestations on the planet. Some of their methods
may also be trusted to store the root keys of a public key infrastructure.
Whatever
organizational niche it shows up in, once the root key of a public key
infrastructure is in place, we’re in a position to establish subsequent
identification of trusted third parties. We might suggest creation of the first
such trusted third party as the “Book of Life.” While it’s highly unlikely that
this particular entity would ever actually be fielded under this name, given
the hallowed position the name holds within the traditions of Christianity, it
in fact conveys the desired concept with iconic purity. To establish a high
degree of trust through reputation, we need a reliable means of associating
differential identity with experiential identity, including a reliable archive
of experiences. Hence, we will use the term as an attempt at clarity within
this discussion.
So, let’s think
of the registration of an anchored persona associated with a differential
identity. This digital persona will allow the third party to assert a name on
the Web while the digital differential identity marker lets us mutually
authenticate our interaction to that name in a highly trusted manner. In
addition, trusted records of transactions engaged through this anchored persona
can be preserved. This requires a few steps to accomplish.
To first
establish a digital persona and differential identity marker, we ask the Book
of Life to grant us a public and private key pair that is associated with our
biometric differential identity. Remembering our earlier consideration of
public key cryptography, we know that our digital name (that is, the public key
from the key pair) can be freely disseminated. This now forms a digital
metaphorical reference to us on the Web. The private key, however, is then our
digital differential identity marker. If someone else besides us has this
private key, then they can masquerade as us on the Web. So, the truly trusted
way for the Book of Life to deliver our digital identity to us is within the
secure form of our own transcendent personal device. How does it do this?
Well, within the
confines of the Book of Life physical location there can be unassigned
transcendent personal devices. To provision (remember the discussion in Chapter
8) this device for a specific person, the public and private key pair can be
generated within the secure core agent
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