the limitations of the dinosaurs as they faced a rapidly changing ecosystem armed with a brain the size of a walnut.

Finally, at least with respect to the need of esteem, the concept of reputation derived from experiential identity comes to the fore. Within the computer world, experiential identity is thoroughly intertwined with archival memory; being able to establish and subsequently recall the experiences in the passing of interactions. Reputation then builds upon the memory of such experiences as reflected or reported by third parties. Thus, for the transcendent personal device to properly establish and evaluate reputation, of its own bearer and also of the other parties to interactions, it must possess or have access to a means of establishing trust in such other parties. As we have noted in previous discussions, this is a manifestation of the recursive evaluation of the trust equation of interactions. So, from an esteem need standpoint, the requirement is for a trusted means to identify and interact with other parties. The actual mechanisms needed, specifically an identification system and a method for secure interactions across time and space, build upon responses to the lower level needs of belonging and safety.

Belonging Needs

Belonging is very much about differential identity. Computers can certainly function in groups as the wide variety of networks currently in play today reminds us. Computers however are tools of humans. They function on behalf of humans. The issue becomes, of course, on behalf of which humans do they function? In today’s dichotomy of client-server computing, a secure core functions primarily as a tool of the server community as opposed to being prosthesis for the bearer, who is after all, the end-user and consumer within the content system.

In fact, differential identity is a central issue in the current state of network infrastructures. Mechanisms in use are typically insufficient to provide an adequate level of trust in the asserted differential identities of transaction participants. Consequently, mistaken identity or improper authentication of identity perceived as “identity theft” are significant problems. Perhaps even more important than solving the problems inherent in current systems, is the enabling of important new areas of policy application that highly trusted differential identity would provide. In a complementary fashion, highly trusted differential identity also provides enhancement opportunities for personal privacy.

The transcendent personal device is a central element in establishing the differential identity of a person. Only by being able to do this can one then develop a reliable credential system on which experiential identity can be based. This is primarily a social ecosystem issue, much like the establishment of the transcendent personal device as a fiduciary acting on behalf of the bearer. While the transcendent personal device itself, if done well technically, can make significant strides in extending the benefits of social grouping mechanisms into the Web, a coherent policy infrastructure will make the effort significantly more trustworthy.

As we’ve considered previously, one of the mechanisms used to convey trust is the use of secrets. We can use a shared secret between two entities to establish a common domain of trust that encompasses the two, as long as we’re confident that no other entity shares the secret. The more entities that share a secret, the less is the degree of trust that we can convey through the knowledge or possession of the secret. If only two entities share a secret and if I am one of the entities, then when another entity can tell me the secret I know precisely the identity of that entity. However, if I want to include many other entities in my own, personal domain of trust, then I have

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