ecosystem. It is perhaps as close as we can get to a pure identity system in which there is no place for theft of identity to occur and for privacy to be abrogated.

In the interest of presenting a moderately succinct description of a basic system, we’ve swept under the rug several issues. For example, within a population of several hundred million individuals, some number of people will not be able to present either an iris pattern or a fingerprint. In such cases, an ultimate fallback position of using DNA patterns as a differential identity marker would likely be required. Moreover, if we consider that being born and dying are the only significant state transitions for personal differential identity, then perhaps a DNA pattern should always be maintained as an auxiliary marker, along with iris patterns and fingerprints. In some instances, as we’ve just noted, this may be the only effective biometric that an individual can present. In a similar vein, in some instances it is only through forensic DNA evidence that it can be determined that a person has died. This obviously has significance if our differential identity registry is intended to present a count only of living individuals. So, this illuminates the need for trusted processes to be put in place to deal with the progression of a person’s experiential identity. While it is important to remember that people are not required by current constitutional mandates to use this registry for the subsequent establishment of experiential identity for purposes other than the census, we note that the registry offers the prospect of enabling the establishment of trust through reputation to the contained individuals through such extended use on a voluntary basis. This brings us to the consideration of extending the basic differential identity system to encompass experiential identity as well. In so doing, we also must consider how to meld the historical methods of identification with this more rigorously constructed system.

If one can establish a differential identity system first, then building experiential identity in addition to it is relatively straightforward. However, the current situation is one in which we have one or more de facto experiential identity systems already in place. In general, these systems are not based on a rigorous differential identity marker. Thus, these systems warrant significantly less trust than can be achieved with biometry based differential identification systems. However, there is not a realistic option of discarding our current systems and starting over again. Thus, one must understand and bring to bear a number of trust evoking processes to blend the old systems into the new. We’ll begin by considering the melding of a new, biometry based enrollment facility with an existing, more arcane identification system based on confluence of information.

Most identity systems today derive their trust in establishing differential identity through the enrollee’s ability to produce one or more documents from a list of acceptable identity source documents. In essence, they establish differential identity through a recurrent process of reference to experiential identity. Consider for example the list of acceptable source documents in applying to the District of Columbia for a driver license, which can then be used subsequently as an identification card for a variety of purposes:

  -     State-issued United States birth certificate or birth certification card.

  -     DC driver’s license, learner’s permit, or identification card, not expired for more than
        180 days.

  -     Unexpired United States passport.

  -     Certificate of Naturalization (N-550, N-570, or N-578).

  -     Certificate of US Citizenship (N-560 or N561).

  -     Letter with picture from Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA) or
        DC Department of Corrections certifying name and date of birth.

Book available at Midori Press (regular)
Book available at Midori Press (signed)
Book available at Amazon (regular)