In Chapter 6, we discussed the components of content, specifically discussing the value equations for information accessed via the Web. Information control translates into market control. Consequently, a variety of players want to position themselves as central to the interaction facilities of the Web. Network equipment and operating system vendors seek to establish themselves as the ultimate trust brokers of the Web, and thereby derive significant impact on the interaction environment. Connectivity vendors such as cable operators and telecommunication companies seek to extend their domains into that of content provision, beyond pure connectivity. And, large content providers are involved in the game as well, seeking ever greater control over not only the provision of content but in its use by the individual. It is interesting to note that many of these entities are providers and consumers of each other’s products and services. Within a dynamic marketplace, it seems often tempting to pursue the customers of one’s customers in an attempt to optimize one’s competitive position. It seems to make for highly recursive “food chains.” Consider an episode involving Sony BMG Music Entertainment.

On November 19, 2005, Dan Mitchell of the New York Times reported that Mark Russinovich, a security expert, had discovered on his computer a new rootkit. This is a form of software modification that allows operating a computer at its most protected level, while being possibly extremely hard to detect. After investigation, he was able to discern that modifications had been made in several software components involved with accessing Compact Discs (CD’s). Finally, he was able to establish that the source of the rootkit was a Sony compact disk that he had recently played on his computer. The mere act of accessing the compact disk in order to extract a music file from it had caused new software to be loaded onto his personal computer; software that comprised a secret modification to his computer’s base operating system. This new software was now in the operational path of any compact disk played on this computer; moreover, any attempt to remove the new software would leave the compact disk unusable. Finally, the rootkit was such that it could be host for computer attacks. All in all, this reflected a rather unexpected course of events for simply trying to play a legitimately purchased compact disk.

The overt purpose of the rootkit was an apparent attempt on the part of Sony to prevent the copying and distribution of the music files from their compact disk without having it actually present. In essence, the compact disk became a credential that conveyed authority for the possessor to play its music. Without the compact disk present, the music wouldn’t play. Moreover, creating a music file on the computer to store the music from the compact disk became encumbered. This anecdote illustrates a couple of points.

First, the operating system on virtually any computer is complex and encompasses a lot of software. The lineage of this software at any given point in time on a specific computer is not always well established unless great care in the administration of the operating system software is maintained. In fact, the prevalent personal computer operating system, Windows, is specifically engineered so as to allow frequent, automatic updates to virtually any part of the system. There are security controls in some places, but obviously very significant elements of the operating system can be replaced with impunity and the replacement is definitely not always of the tamper-evident variety. A second major point illustrated by this episode is the apparent degree of legal ambiguity that exists with regard to who controls a given computer, and even more ambiguous, on whose behalf does a specific computer operate? It would seem highly unlikely that any of corporation would intentionally abrogate legal restraints, and in this particular case, Sony apparently felt entitled to surreptitiously install their own software on customer’s computer, without the owner’s knowledge, in an attempt to enforce copyright protection for the music on a Sony manufactured compact disk. Holding this view would seem to suggest that one does not perceive that a personal computer is specifically intended to act in a fiduciary capacity for the owner of that computer. We

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