-
Unexpired Foreign Passport with un-expired visa issued
for six or more months and I-94 stamp (Arrival and Departure Record).
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Unexpired Refugee Travel Document (I-571).
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Form I-94 (Arrival and Departure Record) stamped
Asylee, Refugee, or INS Asylum Approval Letter.
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Unexpired Employment Authorization Card (I-688A,
I-688B, I-766).
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Unexpired Resident Alien Card (I-551) (also known as
Green Card).
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Unexpired United States Citizen Identification Card
(I-197, I-179).
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Unexpired Diploma Certificate with Diplomat
Identification Card issued by the United States Department of State.
These various
forms of identification documentation are usually connected to the distinct
person only through a name. Thus it is impossible to achieve a very high level
of trust in the differential identity of a person as established by these
documents. The primary reason for this is that there is no strong binding between
the biophysical person and the document. For example, while a passport contains
a picture, the document can still be of questionable trustworthiness because it
may have been obtained by presenting a birth certificate, which doesn’t contain
a picture. So the documents fail to fully meet the quantitative requirements
that we stated in Chapter 9 for differential identity markers able to establish
that a person is not an impostor. The reason that such systems work at all with
some level of efficacy is because most people are not in the business of
beating the system, and they have established moderately verifiable forensic
trails during the course of their lives. However, for the serious adversary,
creating an identity through the forgery of source documents is relatively
straightforward.
Before going
further in our discussion, we want to emphasize that in some situations, this
adversary stance may in fact be our friend. For the French Resistance in World
War II, forged identity was the way of survival. This, of course, is the
ongoing dilemma with identification systems; they can be used for good but also
perverted for ill. In the following, we will illustrate clearly the technical
underpinning of a formal identification system. We will ascertain that our description
brings clarity to the evaluation of the positives and negatives associated with
the use of such a system in a given social order. However, the choices made
following this evaluation are dependent on further elements of trust associated
with such an order. As we will now see, these choices are not binary, but
rather a matter of selection amongst various tools and possibilities.
Since the most
common denominator in existing, credential based experiential identification is
a name, the first step to associate an experiential identification system with
a biometry based differential identification system is to attach a name to the
biometric markers in the differential identity registry. The name then forms
the seminal point of experiential identity for a person. In Chapter 9, when we
discussed the concept of identity in some detail, we ascribed the term anchored persona to this connection
point between differential identity and experiential identity. This is similar
to existing systems in which a name is specified on a birth certificate. So, we
would like to consider how to bring into being a “birth certificate equivalent”
based on the trust infrastructure of a biometry based differential
identification system. Now, the use of any identity credential, including a
birth certificate, requires a significant vetting and issuance process by a trusted third party if any significant
level of trust is to be ascribed to it. So, a rather interesting question is
“What trusted third party can be used to connect a name to a differential
identity?” Moreover, “What technical means make the connection of a name to a
differential identity such that during repetitive interactions it can be
affirmed, to a high degree of trust, that the person
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