varied theologies that form the architecture for each one’s
definition and conveyance of policy. It is this elaboration of policy
mechanisms that makes religion the premiere manifestation of social orders from
human cognition.
The common basis
for the group-wide sharing of religious theology and practice derives from the
concept of faith, a term we might not
normally attach to the definition or implementation of policy. Rather, we tend
to steep the concepts of policy in terms of trust.
While both terms, faith and trust, are very close, we will ascribe a definition
to trust that allows it to subsume that of faith. Thus, we say that trust is an
expectation of an outcome with some degree of assurance. More succinctly stated trust is a
probability of an anticipated outcome. Hence, we see gradations in the degree
of assurance associated with trust: “I trust him with my life.” versus “I don’t
trust him as far as I can throw him!” Interestingly enough, both statements
indicate high levels of trust under our definition. Given either statement, we
can form a probability of outcome for various policy affectations that we might
undertake. When presented with a choice, we follow the path that we anticipate
will lead to the outcome we desire; the certainty of our anticipation reflects
our level of trust in the path. If we don’t have a choice, then our trust level
still allows us to anticipate the outcome whether it might be good or bad. At
the most physiologically primitive level, trust determines whether our response
to stress stimuli is fight or flight. At a more sublime level, trust is the
basis for our actions of self-actualization and transcendence; terms of some
ambiguity at this point, but which we will consider in some detail in
subsequent chapters. Faith then is a guidepost on the road to trust.
When we consider
the grouping mechanisms that we assume have been present since the time of
emergence of the species, we readily identify families, clans, tribes and ever
larger congregations of individuals seeking the benefits of group associations.
Groups enhance the collective prospects for their constituent individuals to
survive and thrive. Indeed, the action of humans through groups is such a
recurrent theme that it exhibits all the properties of an evolutionary trait,
forged by competition, with humans banding together as they have always done
against the threats posed by an unyielding, physical world. So, one can pose
the question, “What is the difference between religion and other social
structures?” From our perspective, the difference lies almost exclusively with
the sources of trust and with the mechanisms through which policy is derived
based on this trust.
Let us postulate
first the form of trust. With appropriate stimuli, the brain can create through
chemical means at a cellular level an altered state of consciousness within its
cognition enabling structures. For some, with appropriate training, virtually
the same state can be created purely through cognitive activity. Likewise, this
altered state can be created through ritual activities aided by appropriate
external stimuli. It can also be evoked through external chemical means, and
through combinations of all of the above. From within this altered state of
consciousness, the mind establishes a high level of confidence in the cognitive
processes encountered or evoked. This confidence forms the basis for our
subsequent interactions. We call trust the expectation that we can essentially
predict with some level of expected certainty the outcome of interactions.
At its
strongest, the altered state of consciousness may be identified with being in
touch with God. In milder form, a feeling of euphoria can be experienced and at
its most benign, it might elicit simple acceptance. Anecdotal experience
suggests that this emotional state varies in intensity among different
individuals or even within a single individual. Hence, trust can present as a
spectrum to which an arbitrary normalization can be applied. If we call the
less intense state faith and the more intense state rapture, then we start to
see a connection to religious belief. On the other hand, one can ascribe
different normalization terms. For example, if we use allegiance as
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